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 The External Dimension of Joining 
and Leaving the EU 
 Central Issues 
•  The EU ’ s membership has expanded from the  ‘ original six ’ countries that founded 
the European Coal and Steel Community to more than two dozen countries from 
across the continent during the course of the past decades. At the same time, as the 
referendum in the United Kingdom from June 2016 and the ensuing events show, a 
Member State may also decide to leave the European Union. 
•  Neither joining nor leaving the EU are easy tasks. Both have not only wide-ranging 
internal legal and political consequences for the Union; they also have important 
external repercussions. Acceding to the EU provides access to its large internal 
market but requires candidate countries to adapt their legal systems to conform 
with the EU ’ s values and  acquis communautaire of  legislation. Hence, the prospect 
of membership is an important tool of the EU ’ s external action. At the same time, 
disentangling a withdrawing Member State from the Union not only turns it from 
subject to object of EU external action; it also, to a large extent, redefi nes that 
state ’ s relations with the rest of the world. 
•  This chapter outlines the legal dimension of joining and leaving the EU from the 
point of view of EU external relations. Given that the EU has a decades-long 
history of accessions, but much more recent experience with a Member State 
willing to leave, the former will be addressed in greater detail than the latter. 
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 I. Joining the EU 
 A. The History of the EU ’ s Enlargement 
 Since the High Contracting Parties to the Treaty of Rome came together in 1957, the 
original Community of six Members has gone through seven rounds of enlargement, 
with the last in July 2013. 
•  First enlargement  – 1 January 1973: Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom 
•  Second enlargement  – 1 January 1981: Greece 
•  Third enlargement  – 1 January 1986: Portugal and Spain 
•  Fourth enlargement  – 1 January 1995: Austria, Finland and Sweden 
•  Fifth enlargement  – 1 May 2004: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia 
•  Sixth enlargement  – 1 January 2007: Bulgaria and Romania 
•  Seventh enlargement  – 1 July 2013: Croatia 
 That EU membership also has implications for a country ’ s place in the wider world was 
well captured in 1975 by Margaret Thatcher, then leader of the British Conservative 
Party, in a speech that launched her party ’ s campaign to remain in the then European 
Economic Community: 
 M Thatcher,  Speech to Conservative Group for Europe (opening Conservative 
referendum campaign) , 16 April 1975 
 And as Harold Macmillan, who made Britain ’ s fi rst application to join the 
Community, said:  ‘ We are European, geographically and culturally and we 
cannot, even if  we would, disassociate ourselves from Europe. ’ 
 That vision of Europe took a leap into reality on the 1st of January 1972 when, 
Mr. Chairman [Edward Heath], due to your endeavours, enthusiasm and dedi-
cation Britain joined the European Community. 
•  The Community gives us peace and security in a free society, a peace and 
security denied to the past two generations. 
•  The Community gives us access to secure sources of food supplies. This is 
vital to us, a country which has to import half  of what we need. 
•  The Community does more trade and gives more aid than any group in the 
world. 
•  The Community gives us the opportunity to represent the Commonwealth 
in Europe. The Commonwealth want us to stay in and has said so. The 
Community wants us. 
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 The largest and in many ways most signifi cant enlargement remains that of 2004, when 
no fewer than ten countries, eight of which were formerly communist Central and 
Eastern European countries (CEECs), became Member States of the EU. As noted 
by then European Commission President Romano Prodi, it was an important step in 
overcoming the division of Europe imposed by the Iron Curtain during the second 
half  of the twentieth century and redefi ned the EU ’ s role in the world: 
 R Prodi, President of the European Commission,  Accession Day, Press 
Conference, Dublin Castle, 1 May 2004, SPEECH/04/221 
 This is truly an historic and a happy day  … For many long years we have 
been preparing the ground for the accession to the European Union of these 
10 countries from central and eastern Europe and the Mediterranean. The 
negotiations we have conducted, while diffi  cult at times, bear witness to our 
common commitment to unify our continent and fi nally to end the artifi cial 
division the Iron Curtain imposed on us for more than half  a century. 
 First, I want to pay tribute to the peoples of Europe who are joining us today. 
Even in the darkest days of Stalinism, they never lost hope. Since the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, they have carried out a quiet revolution based on the democratic 
values that are our common heritage today. 
 I also want to pay tribute to the leaders of these countries  – to the Governments 
and Parliaments that have followed since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Despite 
diffi  culties of all sorts, they have managed to mobilise the whole population in 
their countries and implement courageous reforms. And I also want to pay trib-
ute to the peoples of the 15 older members for welcoming in the new countries 
and sharing their area of prosperity and security with them  … 
 In an increasingly complex world, the enlarged Union, based on democratic 
values, economic openness and a strong social model, can achieve far more than 
any country can ever hope to achieve on its own. 
 It can provide a reference for all those across the world who seek their own path, 
from Latin America to Africa and to Asia. 
 This does not mean that Europeans want to impose their model on others. 
Particularly as our  ‘ model ’ is based on the recognition and safeguarding of our 
diversity. 
 But Europe has a great responsibility to help build a world based on the 
 principles of partnership, fairness and justice. 
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 B. The Legal Framework 
 The legal framework for joining the EU is laid down in Article 49 TEU. 
 Article 49 TEU 
 Any European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is 
committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union. 
The European Parliament and national Parliaments shall be notifi ed of this 
application. The applicant State shall address its application to the Council, 
which shall act unanimously after consulting the Commission and after receiv-
ing the consent of the European Parliament, which shall act by a majority 
of its component members. The conditions of eligibility agreed upon by the 
European Council shall be taken into account. 
 The conditions of admission and the adjustments to the Treaties on which 
the Union is founded, which such admission entails, shall be the subject of an 
agreement between the Member States and the applicant State. This agreement 
shall be submitted for ratifi cation by all the contracting States in accordance 
with their respective constitutional requirements. 
 Thus, both the conditions for accession and the necessary amendments to the EU 
treaties are set out in accession agreements. Although the European Union  – and in 
particular the Commission  – is the key negotiator, the fi nal agreement is concluded 
 ‘ between the Member States and the applicant State ’ and requires the ratifi cation by 
each state. Accession agreements are thus not concluded by the Union (in contrast 
to withdrawal agreements, as we will see later). For these reasons, they form a special 
category of international agreements under EU law, as opposed to  ‘ normal ’ inter-
national agreements concluded by the EU, which follow the procedure laid down in 
Article 218 TFEU (see Chapter 4). 
 The procedure in Article 49 TEU can be described as predominantly intergovern-
mental with signifi cant supranational aspects. First, there is the unanimity requirement 
in the Council at the outset to decide whether a third country can indeed receive 
applicant status. At the end of the procedure, it is the  ‘ contracting ’ parties (to the EU 
Treaties) that must all ratify the Treaty of Accession with the new Member State. Upon 
ratifi cation, the accession agreement becomes part of EU primary law. 
 What is now Article 49 TEU has changed through successive treaty changes: nota-
bly, consent of the European Parliament is now required, and the provision speaks of 
 ‘ consulting ’ the Commission. Additionally, the article now also includes a few substan-
tive requirements. In the Treaty of Rome, the only substantive accession condition was 
that a  European State can apply to become a member, but in the post-Lisbon version 
we fi nd the explicit need for a commitment to the values stated in Article 2 TEU, as 
well as respect for the  ‘ conditions of eligibility agreed upon by the European Council ’ . 
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  1  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council ,  Commission 
Opinion on Serbia ’ s Application for Membership to the European Union ,  COM ( 2011 )  668 fi nal , Brussels, 
12 October 2011. 
  2  Ibid, 12. 
 The latter sentence is important, as it opens the door to the application of an exten-
sive  ‘ EU accession  acquis ’ which has been elaborated in a piecemeal fashion through 
successive enlargements. This occurred predominantly during the 1990s, where we 
saw various European Council meetings laying the bricks of a pre-accession policy in 
preparation for the fi fth enlargement in 2004. This also explains why the Commission is 
 ‘ to be consulted ’ : it indicates that over time enlargement has become a  policy in its own 
right, whereby the Commission plays a crucial policy function in ensuring convergence 
and compliance with the criteria set out by the Member States reunited in the European 
Council. Thus, Article 49 TEU provides the general framework, but not the full picture 
of the steps a third country must take to become a member of the European Union. 
 C. Procedure for Accession to the EU: A Sketch 
 In what follows we provide an overview of the path towards EU accession for a third 
country. The description below is at a relative level of abstraction, since the path 
towards accession of any third country will be specifi c to the political, socio-economic, 
historical and cultural background of the applicant country. 
•  A third country fi rst presents its application to the Council of the EU. This is a 
highly political act and usually, such an application will already have been preceded 
by (extensive) political discussions. This formal request is not quite unlike a 
proposal for marriage: it will usually not occur until it is relatively certain that a 
positive reply will follow, and this within a reasonable time period. 
•  Once the third country has submitted its application, the Council requests the opin-
ion of the Commission. A response of the Council may then come rather swiftly, or 
it may not. In the case of Morocco, the rejection came soon after its application in 
1987, but Turkey received its formal candidate status only in 1997  – ten years after 
its application. In any case, when the third country has presented its application, 
the Council will request the Commission to submit its opinion on this application 
in line with Article 49 TEU. 
•  The Commission ’ s opinion is published rather quickly after the request by the 
Council. For example, Serbia presented its application on 22 December 2009, 
the Council requested the Commission ’ s opinion on 25 October 2010, and the 
Commission delivered this opinion one year later in October 2011. 1 In this opinion, 
one will fi nd a macroscopic overview of the extent to which the applicant lives up 
to the accession criteria at that moment in time (see further below on the accession 
criteria). The granting of the status of  ‘ candidate country ’ based on this report is 
not automatic. It is an important hurdle to be overcome. Granting such status may 
be conditional upon continued eff orts in certain problematic areas. In the case of 
Serbia, the Commission ’ s positive recommendation was predicated  ‘ on the under-
standing that Serbia re-engages in the dialogue with Kosovo ’ . 2 
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  3  General Aff airs Council ,  Conclusions on Enlargement and the Stabilisation and Association Process , 
 Brussels ,  28 February 2012 . 
  4  Conclusions of the European Council, 1/2 March 2012, EUCO 4/3/12 REV 3. 
  5  These are: (1) free movement of goods, (2) free movement of workers, (3) right of establishment 
and freedom to provide services, (4) free movement of capital, (5) public procurement, (6) company law, 
(7)  intellectual property law, (8) competition policy, (9) fi nancial services, (10) information society and 
media, (11) agriculture and rural development, (12) food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy, 
(13) fi sheries, (14) transport policy, (15) energy, (16) taxation, (17) economic and monetary policy, 
(18) statistics, (19) social policy and employment, (20) enterprise and industrial policy, (21) trans-European 
networks, (22) regional policy and coordination of structural instruments, (23) judiciary and fundamental 
rights, (24) justice freedom and security, (25) science and research, (26) education and culture, (27) environ-
ment, (28) consumer and health protection, (29) customs union, (30) external relations, (31) foreign, security 
and defence policy, (32) fi nancial control, (33) fi nancial and budgetary provisions, (34) institutions, and 
(35) other issues. 
  6  Council of the EU, First Accession Conference with Serbia, Brussels, 21 January 2014, doc 5486/14. 
•  Contrary to Article 49 TEU, the practice is such that the fi nal decision on  granting 
candidate status is made by the European Council, rather than the Council. 
Thus, in the case of Serbia, on 28 February 2012, the General Aff airs Council 
stated that it  ‘ recommends to grant Serbia candidate status and looks forward to 
the  confi rmation of this decision by the European Council ’ . 3 This confi rmation 
followed in March of that year. 4 
•  The fact that the applicant is granted candidate status does not mean that formal 
accession negotiations are immediately opened. That decision is again taken by the 
Council and European Council on the basis of strict conditionality. For Serbia, 
the 11 December 2012 Council outlined the need for further progress on Kosovo  – 
among other issues  – as precondition for opening accession negotiations. In these 
conclusions, the Council invited the Commission to report on progress in 2013, 
stating that a positive recommendation from that institution would lead to opening 
formal negotiations during the following rotating Presidency. 
•  Once the Council  – again as confi rmed by the European Council  – agrees, negotia-
tions are opened based on a negotiation framework proposed by the Commission. 
For Serbia, this step at European Council level occurred in June 2013, with the 
fi rst round of negotiations starting in January 2014. Such negotiations concern the 
adoption, implementation and enforcement of the EU  acquis which is composed 
of 35 chapters divided according to policy fi eld. 5 One should not understand these 
 ‘ negotiations ’ in the traditional sense of negotiating an international agreement 
between equal sovereign nations. In fact, it concerns a lengthy process of agreeing 
on how and when to adopt and implement EU rules, without fl exibility on defi ning 
the substance of the rules themselves. In these negotiations, chapters are not taken 
all at once, imposing further hurdles of conditionality in the pre-accession process: 
the Council may politically prioritise which to open fi rst, before it is possible to 
move to other areas of the  acquis . For instance, it has become common practice 
to tackle the chapters on  ‘ judiciary and fundamental rights ’ and  ‘ justice, freedom 
and security ’ early in the negotiations to allow maximum time to establish the 
necessary legislation, institutions and solid track records of implementation before 
the negotiations are closed. 6 The negotiations take place between representatives 
of the EU and the candidate country in so-called intergovernmental conferences. 
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  7  Commission Opinion on the application for accession to the European Union by the Republic of 
Croatia, COM(2011) 667 fi nal, Brussels 12 October 2011. 
For each chapter, the European Commission fi rst carries out a detailed examination 
(called  ‘ screening ’ ) to determine the level of preparedness of the candidate country. 
On this basis, the Commission either recommends the opening of the negotiations 
or requires certain conditions to be fulfi lled: the so-called  ‘ opening benchmarks ’ . 
During the negotiations  – which can take many years  – the EU then provides exten-
sive support to the candidate country for the eff ective incorporation of the  acquis . 
Overall, this  ‘ negotiation ’ is a constant back and forth between the third country, 
the Commission and the Council consisting of regular progress reports, strategy 
papers etc in order to progressively  ‘ close ’ the chapters and prepare the applicant for 
membership. For most chapters, the Council will set  ‘ closing benchmarks ’ which need 
to be met by the candidate country before negotiations in the policy fi eld concerned 
can be closed. The pace of negotiations thus depends upon the progress in comply-
ing with the relevant benchmarks. This implies that the accession negotiations are 
an open-ended process the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand. 
 Conclusions of the General Aff airs Council, 25 June 2013, 11443/13, 7 
 The Council recommends to the June European Council [held three days later], 
with a view to holding the fi rst intergovernmental conference with Serbia in 
January 2014 at the very latest, to invite the Commission to submit without 
delay a proposal for a framework for negotiations in line with the European 
Council ’ s December 2006 conclusions and established practice, also incorporat-
ing the new approach to the chapters on the judiciary and fundamental rights 
and justice, freedom and security. The steps leading to the normalisation of rela-
tions between Belgrade and Pristina will also be addressed in the framework. 
Prior to the fi rst intergovernmental conference, this negotiating framework will 
be adopted by the Council and confi rmed by the European Council. The Council 
also recommends to the June European Council to invite the Commission to 
carry out the process of analytical examination of the  acquis communautaire 
with Serbia, starting with the above-mentioned chapters to facilitate rapid early 
progress in these negotiations. 
•  Once the negotiations and accompanying reforms have been completed, the coun-
try can join the Union. This will be signalled by a  ‘ Commission Opinion on the 
application for accession to the EU ’ by the third country. For Croatia, this  ‘ favour-
able opinion ’ addressed to the Council was given on 12 October 2011. 7 
•  A candidate country accedes to the Union once it and all the Member States have 
ratifi ed the accession agreement between them and that country. This agreement 
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  8  European Parliament Legal Service ,  Briefi ng No 23 Legal Questions of Enlargement ,  Luxembourg, 
 19 May 1998 , PE 167.617, 5. 
is specifi c in that the EU itself  is not a party, and the agreement is ratifi ed by all 
EU Member States as contracting parties. The accession treaties are nevertheless 
part of the primary law of the EU. The content is rather technical as it will usually 
make adjustments to the TEU and the TFEU which are largely of an institutional 
nature (allocation of seats in the EP etc) so as to prepare the Union (institutions) 
to welcome the new Member State. 
 D. The  ‘ Conditions of Eligibility ’ : The Copenhagen Criteria 
 Article  49 TEU states that any  European state may apply to become a member, a 
criterion which is open to interpretation. In the run-up to the June 1993 Copenhagen 
European Council, the Commission captured the diffi  culty of defi ning what it means 
to fulfi l this condition for eligibility. 
 European Commission,  Europe and the Challenge of Enlargement , 24 June 1992, 
Bulletin of the EC, supplement 3/92, para 7 
 The term  ‘ European ’ has not been offi  cially defi ned. It combines  geographical, 
historical and cultural elements which all contribute to the European identity. 
The shared experience of proximity, ideas, values, and historical interaction 
cannot be condensed into a simple formula, and is subject to review each 
succeeding generation. The Commission believes that it is neither possible 
nor opportune to establish now the frontiers of the European Union whose 
contours will be shaped over many years to come. 
 In 1987, Morocco submitted an application to become a member of the (then) 
European Communities but was rejected by the Council on the grounds that it was 
not a European state. 8 Turkey also applied in 1987 and it received candidate status 
a decade later. However, its accession negotiations have been signifi cantly hampered 
by the political debate in Member States over whether this criterion has indeed been 
fulfi lled. The EU institutions and Member States have never explicitly defi ned what it 
means to be  ‘ European ’ . At the 1993 Copenhagen European Council, which authori-
tatively codifi ed the essential conditions for accession, the focus was entirely political 
and economic in nature. These  ‘ Copenhagen criteria ’ have been incorporated into the 
Article 49 TEU procedure in the statement  ‘ the conditions of eligibility agreed upon 
by the European Council shall be taken into account ’ . 
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  9  C  Hillion ,  ‘ The Copenhagen Criteria and their Progeny ’ in  C  Hillion (ed)  EU Enlargement: A Legal 
Approach ( Oxford ,  Hart Publishing ,  2004 )  3 . 
 Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen European Council, 21 – 22 June 1993, 
13 (numbering added) 
 Membership requires that the candidate country has  [1] achieved stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect 
for and protection of minorities,  [2] the existence of a functioning market econ-
omy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces 
within the Union. Membership presupposes  [3] the candidate ’ s ability to take 
on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, 
economic and monetary union. 
 [4] The Union ’ s capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the momen-
tum of European integration, is also an important consideration in the general 
interest of both the Union and the candidate countries. 
 The fi rst criterion is one of political conditionality, the second is an economic 
criterion, the third entails the need to fully adopt the  acquis and the fourth pertains to 
the Union ’ s own  ‘ absorption capacity ’ and the debate over widening versus deepening 
the EU. We will discuss these  ‘ Copenhagen criteria ’ in turn. 
 (i) First Criterion: Political Conditionality and Stability of Institutions 
 Article 49 TEU refers to the need for applicant countries to respect and show commit-
ment to the values listed in Article  2 TEU. These include human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of 
persons belonging to minorities. This reference was not present in the pre-Amsterdam 
version of the accession procedure, hence this inclusion represents the constitutionali-
sation of the political conditionality embedded in the fi rst Copenhagen criterion. 9 The 
notion of a European community based on free and democratic European states was 
already stated in the Treaty of Rome itself  and was explicitly taken up as a criterion 
during the second and third enlargements of 1981 and 1986 applied to countries tran-
sitioning from non-democratic regimes. 
 C Hillion,  ‘ The Copenhagen Criteria and their Progeny ’ in C Hillion (ed) 
 EU Enlargement: A Legal Approach (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2004) 4 – 5 
 [T]he political conditionality fi rst materialised in the context of the EEC relations 
with Greece, Portugal and Spain. Discussions on their potential membership 
were made conditional to their acceptance and establishment of democracy. 
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  10  European Commission,  Europe and the Challenge of Enlargement , 24 June 1992, Bulletin of the EC, 
supplement 3/92, 9. 
Indeed, the development of Greece ’ s relations with the EEC was frozen follow-
ing the coup of the  ‘ Colonels ’ , while Spain and Portugal had to free themselves 
of their dictatorships before they could eventually be regarded as admissible 
states  … the Preamble of the Commission ’ s opinions on the applications of the 
three southern candidates  … underlined that: the principles of pluralist democ-
racy and respect for human rights form part of the common heritage of the 
peoples of the States brought together in the European communities and are 
therefore essential elements of membership of the said Communities. 
 The concrete implementation of the political conditionality criterion means that the 
Commission carries out a systematic examination of the main ways in which the appli-
cant country ’ s public authorities are organised and operate, as well as the mechanisms 
for the protection of fundamental rights. Therefore, it aims to assess the extent to 
which democracy and the rule of law operate  in practice , and indeed this is not merely 
a formal or abstract requirement. This examination, therefore, includes a substantive 
assessment of the structure, powers and functioning of the legislative, executive and 
judicial branches; and a close look at the actual exercise of civil and political rights and 
the protection of minorities. 
 During later European Councils, political conditionality was fl eshed out further 
due to specifi c (geo)political requirements. In particular, the requirement to solve all 
bilateral disputes before accession, if  needed through involvement of the International 
Court of Justice, has become an increasingly important condition for membership. 
Whereas this is sometimes considered to be part of the general political conditions 
for membership, it may also be regarded as part of a separate condition of  ‘ good 
neighbourliness ’ . 
 (ii) Second Criterion: Functioning Market Economy 
 Membership of  the Union requires a functioning and competitive market economy. 
If  an applicant acceded without it, membership would be more likely to harm than 
benefi t the economy of  such a country, but it would also disrupt the good function-
ing of  the internal market. 10 The reasoning goes that in the absence of  fl exibility in 
the economy and without a suffi  cient level of  human and physical capital and infra-
structure, competitive pressures upon entering could soon be considered too intense 
by some sections of  society. The consequence could be calls for protective measures 
and a national refl ex which, if  implemented, would undermine the internal market. 
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  11  Hillion (n 9) 9. 
  12  European Commission (n 10) 12. 
  13  K  Smith ,  ‘ The Evolution and Application of EU Membership Conditionality ’ in  M  Cremona (ed) 
 The Enlargement of the European Union ( Oxford ,  Oxford University Press ,  2003 )  112 . 
  14  European Commission (n 10) 9. 
 (iii) Third Criterion: Taking on the Obligations of Membership 
 Membership equally implies the acceptance of the EU  acquis (eg, the rights and obliga-
tions, actual and potential, of the Union legal and political system, and its institutional 
framework). The  acquis is a broad notion which includes (1) the principles and politi-
cal objectives of the Treaties, (2) the secondary legislation adopted to implement the 
Treaties as well as the case law of EU Courts, (3) soft legal documents such as decla-
rations and resolutions adopted in the Union framework as well as (4) international 
agreements concluded by the Union and its Member States in relation to Union poli-
cies. The criterion that an applicant must take on the obligations of membership then 
has two predominant implications, which essentially mean that if  a country wishes to 
accede, the  acquis is very much a take-it-or-leave-it aff air. 
 First, the applicant must  accept the entire acquis . This obligation of full legal 
approximation means that any diffi  culties on the side of the applicant should be 
resolved through transitional measures in the third country rather than by adapting 
EU rules. 11 During the Maastricht Treaty negotiations, both Denmark and the UK 
had negotiated opt-outs to the third stage of Economic and Monetary Union, and 
Britain also to the Social chapter. In relation to the subsequent fi fth enlargement, the 
Commission thus strongly expressed its view that the  acquis must be accepted as a 
whole to safeguard the achievements of European integration. 12 The possibility of 
past opt-outs becoming the rule rather than the exception was to be severely limited. 
This implies that new Member States are expected to work towards joining the Euro 
and that they must accept and implement the CFSP as it stands upon accession and 
its subsequent evolution. If  an applicant country ’ s stance in international aff airs does 
not permit this, it cannot be satisfactorily integrated into the Union. For CFSP, this 
was particularly relevant for the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995, 
due to their long-standing policies of neutrality or non-alignment. This was resolved 
with the phrase in the Treaty on European Union that the European (now Common) 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)  ‘ shall not prejudice the specifi c character of the 
security and defence policy of certain member States ’ 13 (current Article 42(2) TEU; 
see Chapter 9). 
 Second, taking on the obligations of membership also means that the applicant 
state needs to  eff ectively apply and implement the  acquis . In this sense, it means that 
the applicant state should have the legal and administrative framework in the public 
and private sectors to implement and enforce all aspects of the acquis (and thus also 
the fi rst two Copenhagen criteria). 14 This consideration was particularly acute in rela-
tion to the CEECs during the fi fth enlargement. It is for that reason that the 1995 
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  15  Presidency Conclusions, Essen European Council 9/10 December 1994, Pt 12. 
  16  See, eg, Presidency Conclusions Helsinki European Council 10 – 11 December 1999, Pt 4. 
Madrid European Council expanded on this third Copenhagen criterion by stating 
the EU pre-accession strategy should also include the  ‘ adjustment of their administra-
tive structures ’ . Below we expand on how EU enlargement  policy has been devised 
exactly to guarantee that countries fulfi l what is essentially a horizontal accession 
requirement: the institutional capacity to  in concreto apply, support and implement 
the legal, political and economic obligations of EU membership. 
 (iv) Fourth Criterion: Integration (or Absorption) Capacity 
 The 1993 Copenhagen European Council added a fourth accession criterion which 
applies to the Union itself. Namely, it is important to take into consideration the 
general interest of the Union in terms of  ‘ absorption capacity ’ to ensure the momen-
tum of European Integration. In its 2006 – 2007 enlargement strategy paper, the 
Commission introduced the concept  ‘ integration capacity ’ to point at the EU ’ s ability 
to function eff ectively after enlargement. 
 European Commission,  Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2006 – 2007 , 
COM(2006) 649 Brussels, 8 November 2006, 17 
 The EU ’ s absorption capacity, or rather integration capacity, is determined by 
the development of the EU ’ s policies and institutions, and by the transforma-
tion of applicants into well-prepared Member States. The capacity of would-be 
members to accede to the Union is rigorously assessed by the Commission 
on the basis of strict conditionality. Integration capacity is about whether the 
EU can take in new members at a given moment or in a given period,  without 
 jeopardizing the political and policy objectives established by the Treaties. 
Hence, it is fi rst and foremost a functional concept. 
 E. The Condition of  ‘ Good Neighbourliness ’ 
 The enlargement policy of the EU aims to create security, stability and prosperity on 
the European continent. It is, therefore, no coincidence that the promotion of regional 
cooperation and good neighbourly relations constitutes an essential part of the EU ’ s 
pre-accession strategy. This was explicitly recognized for the fi rst time in the Presidency 
Conclusions of the 1994 Essen European Council 15 and later developed in subsequent 
European Council meetings. 16 
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  17  Council of the EU (n 6). 
 P Van Elsuwege,  ‘ Good Neighbourliness as a Condition for Accession to the 
European Union: Searching the Balance between Law and Politics ’ in D Kochenov 
and E Basheska (eds)  Good Neighbourly Relations in the European Legal Context 
(Leiden, Brill/Nijhoff , 2015) 217 
 … the 1993 Copenhagen European Council ignored the principle of good 
neighbourliness when it defi ned the political, economic and legal conditions 
for accession to the EU. It was only one year later, at the 1994 Essen European 
Council, that the promotion of good neighbourly relations formally entered 
the EU ’ s pre-accession strategy. This evolution cannot be disconnected from 
the so-called  Pact on Stability in Europe . The latter had been initiated in 1993 
on the initiative of the French Foreign Minister Eduard Balladur and became 
the fi rst EU Joint Action within the framework of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP). The main objective was to bring together all Central 
and Eastern European countries into a pan-European conference in order to 
discuss outstanding issues related to the protection of minorities and the delim-
itation of borders  … The work conducted within the context of the Stability 
Pact for Europe helped to operationalize the principle of good neighbourliness 
as a precondition for EU accession. Derived from the UN Charter, the 1975 
CSCE Helsinki Final Act and the 1990 CSCE Charter [of Paris for a New 
Europe], it requires the candidate countries ’ respect for ten principles, including 
(1) sovereign equality of states, (2) refraining from the threat or use of force, 
(3) inviolability of frontiers, (4) territorial integrity of states, (5) peaceful settle-
ment of disputes, (6) non-intervention in internal aff airs of other countries, 
(7) human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, 
conscience, religion and belief, (8) equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples, (9) cooperation among states and (10) fulfi lment in good faith of 
 obligations under  international law. 
 Good neighbourliness has gained particular importance during the EU accession 
preparations of the Western Balkan countries. The obligation to foster cooperation 
and good neighbourly relations with the other countries of the region is included in all 
Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs) and has become a standard item in 
the annual Commission monitoring reports assessing the preparedness of candidate 
countries for accession to the European Union. Moreover, it found its way into the 
process of EU accession negotiations. For instance, the negotiating framework with 
Serbia explicitly refers to the normalisation of relations with Kosovo, which should 
lead to a legally binding agreement by the end of Serbia ’ s accession negotiations. 
This issue is addressed as a specifi c item under chapter 35 on  ‘ other issues ’ . 17 
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  18  Council conclusions on enlargement and stablisation and association process, 18 June 2019. The fi nal 
decision on opening accession negotiations with North Macedonia (and Albania) still had to be taken when 
this manuscript was fi nished. 
  19  European Council Conclusions, Essen, 9 – 10 December 1994, Annex IV. 
  20  K  Inglis ,  ‘ The Europe Agreements Compared in the Light of their Pre-Accession Reorientation ’ ( 2000 ) 
 37  Common Market Law Review  1173, 1182 . 
 The Prespa Agreement settling the name dispute between Greece and the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, based on which the latter offi  cially became the 
Republic of North Macedonia, may be regarded as an example of good neighbour-
liness. It removed an important obstacle towards the possible start of accession 
negotiations, which had been recommended by the European Commission since 2009. 
Following the conclusion of the Prespa Agreement, as well as the Treaty on Good 
Neighbourly Relations with Bulgaria, the Council envisaged it would decide on this 
question no later than October 2019. 18 
 II. EU Enlargement Policy in Practice 
 In this section, we examine the development of a fully-fl edged EU enlargement  policy in 
preparation for the 2004, 2007 and 2013 enlargements. As a starting point it is notable that 
there is a world of diff erence between the latest three rounds and the preceding rounds 
of enlargement because, beforehand, one could not speak of a strategy or  ‘ policy of 
pre-accession ’ . We have seen that acceding to the Union requires the aspiring Member 
State to make numerous legislative, institutional, economic and political adaptations. 
During the fi rst four enlargements, diffi  culties for the applicant to adapt to the acquis were 
commonly resolved during transitional periods included in the accession agreement, 
therefore taking place  after accession. However, in the lead-up to the 2004 enlargement 
of the Central and Eastern European countries, a true strategic pre-accession process 
unfolded based on the 1993 Copenhagen criteria. This was a consequence of the fact 
that the complexity and volume of the  acquis had grown signifi cantly between the 1970s 
and the 1990s, but more importantly because greater convergence between the EU and 
the aspiring CEECs was required to ensure a successful enlargement for both sides. 
 The EU ’ s general enlargement policy  vis- à -vis the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe basically started with the formulation of the 1993 Copenhagen criteria and 
the formal proclamation of a  ‘ pre-accession strategy ’ at the December 1994 Essen 
European Council. 19 The latter involved a bilateral and multilateral dimension. At the 
bilateral end, it meant a substantive re-orientation of the Europe Agreements from 
association to pre-accession instruments, without actually renegotiating the texts of 
these agreements. It was rather through a pragmatic policy process that the Europe 
Agreements and its institutions became the bilateral conduit for intensifi ed, tailor-
made pre-accession collaboration. 20 On the multilateral side, there was the creation 
of a so-called  ‘ Structured Dialogue ’ . This relationship covered all areas of the  acquis 
and was meant to familiarize the candidate countries with the various activities of the 
Union by allowing CEECs representatives to meet with their EU counterparts, mostly 
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  21  M Maresceau,  ‘ Pre-accession ’ in M Cremona (ed) The Enlargement of the European Union (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2003) 20. 
  22  European Commission , Agenda 2000: For a stronger and wider Union , 15 July 1997, COM(97) 2000 fi nal. 
in the margins of formal Council meetings. 21 Finally, it is important to recall that the 
launch of the pre-accession strategy was also meant to prepare the EU itself  in line 
with the fourth Copenhagen criterion. Thus, the European Council announced as part 
of its strategy that the institutional conditions for ensuring the proper functioning of 
the Union must be created at the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference (ICG), in what 
became known as the Amsterdam Treaty. 
 Meanwhile, Malta and Cyprus had also submitted applications for EU membership 
and were also included in the pre-accession process. In December 1995, the Madrid 
European Council decided that accession negotiations could start six months after 
the end of the 1996 IGC. In June 1997, the European Council reached the following 
conclusions: 
 European Council Conclusions, Amsterdam, 16 – 17 June 1997 
 The European Council notes that, with the successful conclusion of the 
Intergovernmental Conference, the way is now open for launching the enlargement 
process in accordance with the conclusions of the Madrid European Council. 
 It welcomes the Commission ’ s intention to present by mid-July its opinions on 
the accession applications as well as a comprehensive communication ( ‘ Agenda 
2000 ’ ) covering the development of Union policies including the agricultural 
and structural policies, the horizontal questions related to enlargement and 
fi nally the future fi nancial framework beyond 1999. 
 The European Council notes that the Commission in its Agenda 2000 communi-
cation will draw the main conclusions and recommendations from the opinions 
and give its views on the launching of the accession process including  proposals 
on reinforcing pre-accession strategy and further developing pre-accession 
assistance building on ongoing reforms of PHARE. 
 The Commission Communication entitled  ‘ Agenda 2000: For a stronger and wider 
union ’ was published in July 1997 22 and contained Commission opinions on each 
application for membership. The individual country opinions were contentious, as the 
Commission stated that only fi ve CEECs were ready to open accession negotiations: 
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Estonia. The Commission opinion 
on Cyprus was positive, whereas Malta had excluded itself  by freezing its application 
for membership. The December 1997 Luxembourg European Council confi rmed the 
choice for the fi ve CEECs made by the Commission and agreed upon Agenda 2000 ’ s 
 enhanced pre-accession strategy which  – sensitive to negative political responses from 
excluded applicants  – was applied to all CEECs. Enhanced pre-accession was applied 
to Cyprus and Malta from 2000 onwards. 
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 The enhanced pre-accession strategy established a comprehensive legal framework 
for supporting and monitoring the situation in the applicant countries, with the intro-
duction of Accession Partnerships (APs) as the core instrument. For each candidate 
country, an individual AP laid down, in a single framework, the priority areas for further 
progress towards accession, the fi nancial assistance available for implementing these 
priorities and the conditions applicable to that assistance. The priorities were identifi ed 
on the basis of the Commission ’ s opinions and, later on, its annual progress reports. 
Consequently, the Commission played a crucial role in the preparation of the APs even 
though, from a legal point of view, they took the form of unilateral Council decisions. 
 The December 2002 European Council in Copenhagen confi rmed the conclusion 
of accession negotiations with the CEECs (minus Romania and Bulgaria), Cyprus and 
Malta. The Accession Treaty between the candidates and the (then) 15 Member States 
was signed in April 2003 and entered into force on 1 May 2004. However, the fi fth 
accession did not come without its caveats. Signifi cant transitional arrangements were 
included in the accession agreement, including post-accession conditionality. 
 K Inglis,  ‘ The Union ’ s Fifth Accession Treaty: New Means to Make Enlargement 
Possible ’ (2004) 41  Common Market Law Review 937, 971 – 72 
 The current Accession Treaty distinguishes itself  from previous accession treaty 
practice for a number of reasons. While this is the fi rst enlargement where the 
in-comers are not acceding to the entirety of the Union ’ s activities, the new 
Member States are given no option to permanently derogate from the  acquis 
nor to opt out from those chapters where certain of the Fifteen have opted out  – 
Schengen and EMU. Also, the trust of the Fifteen Member States in the new 
Member States ’ capacity and willingness to meet the obligations of membership 
has arisen in the current enlargement. Trust arises as an issue because of the 
lack of proven performance of the ex-communist countries. In the context of 
an enlarged Union, expectations with respect to the incoming Member States ’ 
future behaviour is put under further strain due to the dramatic increase in the 
number of Member States combined with the deepening and widening of EU 
integration, and the consequent intensifi cation of monitoring and enforcement 
eff orts to ensure the integrity of the  acquis in a Union of twenty-fi ve  … 
 Perhaps the single most controversial topic in the months that preceded enlarge-
ment was that of the movement of workers. Public fears of mass migration to 
the Fifteen led most of them to make use of the transitional arrangements for 
workers in respect of workers from the eight CEEC Member States. 
 The EU ’ s sixth accession treaty regarding the enlargement towards Bulgaria and 
Romania introduced new mechanisms of conditionality. For instance, it included a 
 ‘ membership postponement safeguard clause ’ giving the Council the possibility to post-
pone the envisaged date of accession by twelve months should the acceding countries 
fail to fulfi l their commitments following the end of accession negotiations. This unique 
clause was not used in practice. Both countries could join the EU on 1 January 2007. 
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  23  Commission Decision 2006/928/EC of 13 December 2006 establishing a mechanism for cooperation and 
verifi cation of progress in Romania to address specifi c benchmarks in the areas of judicial reform and the 
fi ght against corruption [2006] OJ L 354/56; Commission Decision 2006/929/EC of 13 December 2006 estab-
lishing a mechanism for cooperation and verifi cation of progress in Bulgaria to address specifi c benchmarks 
in the areas of judicial reform and the fi ght against corruption and organized crime [2006] OJ L354/58. 
  24  The annual CVM reports are available at:  https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-
rights/eff ective-justice/rule-law/assistance-bulgaria-and-romania-under-cvm_en . 
 A  Ł azowski,  ‘ And Then They were Twenty-Seven … A Legal Appraisal of the 
Sixth Accession Treaty ’ (2007) 44  Common Market Law Review 401, 416 
 The membership postponement safeguard clause was not used; nevertheless, 
it can be argued that its mere existence played an important political role. It 
served as a stick to discipline the forthcoming members in their last-minute pre-
accession eff orts. Had it been used, its potential benefi ts would have been rather 
limited. The postponement of membership by 12 months would not have saved 
the European Union from admitting the two countries struggling with their 
accession commitments. 
 In addition, the European Commission set up a Cooperation and Verifi cation 
Mechanism (CVM) on the legal basis of the internal market and justice and home 
aff airs safeguard clauses. 23 This allowed the Commission to continue assessing the two 
countries ’ progress in relation to judicial reform, corruption and (only for Bulgaria) 
organised crime on the basis of a benchmarking procedure. The Commission issued its 
fi rst assessment report on 27 June 2007 and, more than ten years after the Romania ’ s 
and Bulgaria ’ s accession, this practice still exists. 24 The Commission reports are 
discussed and endorsed by the Council. In practice, the Schengen accession of Romania 
and Bulgaria has been tied to removal of the CVM. 
 Council Conclusions on the Cooperation and Verifi cation Mechanism, Brussels, 
12 December 2018, doc 15187/18 
 The Council reiterates that the Cooperation and Verifi cation Mechanism 
continues to be instrumental for progress. It remains an appropriate tool to 
assist Bulgaria and Romania in their respective reform eff orts, in order for each 
of them to achieve a record of concrete and lasting results required to fulfi l the 
objectives of the Mechanism. The Council recalls its continued readiness to 
support eff orts of Bulgaria and Romania in this regard through EU and bilat-
eral assistance. Pending the satisfactory fulfi lment of all respective benchmarks 
through a substantial and lasting reform process, which the Council expects in 
this framework, the Mechanism stays in place. 
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 The EU ’ s seventh accession agreement was signed on 9 December 2011 between Croatia 
and the, at that time, 27 EU Member States. It includes a new monitoring mechanism 
based on conditionality and benchmarking particularly (but not exclusively) in the 
area of the judiciary and fundamental rights. Apart from the  ‘ membership postpone-
ment safeguard clause ’ , it also covers a set of safeguard clauses known from previous 
accession treaties (ie, the general economic safeguard clause, the economic market 
safeguard clause and the Justice and Home Aff airs safeguard clause). 25 Hence, it seems 
fair to conclude that the evolution of the EU ’ s pre-accession conditionality since the 
preparation of the EU ’ s fi fth enlargement goes hand in hand with increased attention 
for post-accession conditionality in the treaties of accession. 
 III. The Future of EU Enlargement Policy 
 Each year, the European Commission adopts its  ‘ enlargement package ’ , setting out the 
state of play of the EU ’ s enlargement policy together with country reports assessing 
the situation in each candidate country and potential candidate. 
 European Commission,  2018 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy , 
COM(2018) 450 fi nal, Strasbourg, 17 April 2018, 1 
 The enlargement process continues to be built on established criteria and fair 
and rigorous conditionality. Each country is assessed on the basis of its own 
merits. The assessment of progress achieved and the identifi cation of short-
comings aim to provide incentives and guidance to the countries to pursue the 
necessary far-reaching reforms. For the prospect of enlargement to become 
a reality, a fi rm commitment to the principle of  ‘ fundamentals fi rst ’ remains 
essential. Structural shortcomings persist, notably in the key areas of the rule 
of law and the economy. Accession candidates must deliver on the rule of law, 
justice reform, fi ght against corruption and organised crime, security, funda-
mental rights, democratic institutions and public administration reform, as well 
as on economic development and competitiveness. Given the complex nature of 
the necessary reforms, it is a long-term process. 
 The EU ’ s enlargement process currently includes the countries of the Western Balkans, 
which are all given the prospect of EU membership in the framework of the so-called 
Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), and Turkey, which has been recognised as 
a candidate country at the December 1999 Helsinki European Council. For a substan-
tive analysis of the EU’s relations with these countries, see Chapter 13 on ‘The EU and 
its neighbours’. 
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 A. Accession Prospects for the Western Balkans 
 The EU remains committed to ensure a credible enlargement perspective for the 
Western Balkans. In this respect, the European Commission envisaged an enhanced 
engagement with the region, based upon the well-known principles of conditionality 
and diff erentiation. 
 European Commission,  A credible enlargement perspective for an enhanced EU 
engagement with the Western Balkans , COM(2018) 65 fi nal, 2 
 Accession negotiations are already well underway with Montenegro and Serbia. 
With strong political will, the delivery of real and sustained reforms, and defi nitive 
solutions to disputes with neighbours, they could potentially be ready for member-
ship in a 2025 perspective. This perspective is extremely ambitious. Whether it is 
achieved will depend fully on the objective merits and results of each country. 
 … 
 The Western Balkan countries now have a  historic window of opportunity to 
fi rmly and unequivocally bind their future to the European Union. They will 
have to act with determination. Accession is and will remain a merit-based 
process fully dependent on the objective progress achieved by each country. The 
countries may catch up or overtake each other depending on progress made. 
 The Commission is ready to prepare recommendations to open accession nego-
tiations with Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, on the 
basis of fulfi lled conditions. With sustained eff ort and engagement, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina could become a candidate for accession. Kosovo* has an oppor-
tunity for sustainable progress through implementation of the Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement and to advance on its European path once objective 
circumstances allow. 
 The Commission ’ s ambitious strategy for the Western Balkans implied, amongst 
others, a road map for Montenegro and Serbia to complete their accession process 
in a 2025 perspective and the opening of accession negotiations with Albania and 
North Macedonia. In its 2019 Communication on the EU ’ s enlargement policy, the 
Commission explicitly asked the EU Member States to take  ‘ concrete and fast action ’ 
in order to ensure the EU ’ s credibility in the region and beyond. 
 European Commission,  Communication on EU Enlargement Policy COM(2019) 
260 fi nal, 1 – 2 
 The EU ’ s enhanced engagement with and commitment to the region over the 
last year is already yielding concrete and signifi cant  results . North Macedonia 
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not only continued its ambitious reform agenda, but also reached a historic 
agreement with Greece resolving a 27-year old name dispute. This, together 
with the bilateral agreement with Bulgaria, is an example of how to strengthen 
good neighbourly relations for the entire region, and testimony to the power of 
attraction of the European perspective. Similarly, Albania is pursuing profound 
reforms, in particular a major transformation of its justice system, including an 
unprecedented re-evaluation of judges and prosecutors. 
 This welcome progress achieved now calls for the Union ’ s concrete and fast 
action. The EU has the opportunity, and a strong self-interest, to lock in long-
term positive momentum across the region. The Union must live up to its 
commitments and give credit where credit is due. Failure to reward objective 
progress by moving to the next stage of the European path would damage the 
EU ’ s credibility throughout the region and beyond. A tepid response to historic 
achievements and substantial reforms would undermine stability, seriously 
discourage much needed further reforms and aff ect work on sensitive bilateral 
issues like the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue. Strategically, it would only help the 
EU ’ s geopolitical competitors to root themselves on Europe ’ s doorstep. 
 Non-Paper on Reforming the European Union Accession Process, November 2019 
 Twenty years after recognizing the European perspective of the Western Balkan 
countries, despite the reforms undertaken and the courageous acts of recon-
ciliation undertaken (such as the Prespa Agreement), the profound political, 
economic and social transformations required for a future accession to the 
European Union continue to be too slow and the concrete benefi ts for citizens 
in candidate countries remain insuffi  cient. 
 A renewed approach to the accession process is therefore necessary to support 
the Western Balkan countries in concrete terms with regard to the reforms neces-
sary to fully comply with the rule of law and generally to apply the European 
acquis. This approach should be accompanied by a strong commitment by the 
European Union in order to help them to confront the numerous and complex 
challenges related to their economic and social development, to have command 
of the competences regarding their territory, and confront their migration and 
security challenges. 
 However, the 17–18 October 2019 European Council failed to reach a consensus on 
the next steps. France, in particular, opposed the start of accession negotiations with 
Albania and North Macedonia and requested a fundamental revision of the EU ’ s 
enlargement policy. The French position was clarifi ed in a non-paper, published in 
November 2019. 
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  27  Commission Opinion on Turkey ’ s request for accession to the Community, SEC (1989) 2290 fi nal, 8. 
  28  Presidency Conclusions Helsinki European Council, 10–11 December 1999, para 12. 
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 A renewed approach should be based on 4 principles: gradual association; strin-
gent conditions; tangible benefi ts; reversibility 
•  Negotiations organized around policy blocks, in which candidate countries 
would gradually be included; 
•  Stringent conditions, in order to eff ectively converge towards European 
norms and standards over the long term, in the fi eld of the rule of law, but 
also economic and social convergence; 
•  Concrete benefi ts during the process (which are currently lacking and 
prevent migratory movements from being stemmed, posing problems for 
both parties), particularly through increased fi nancial support; 
•  A reversible process to ensure its credibility and incentive nature. 
 This new approach would also be based on enhanced political governance 
 B. Turkey: A Candidate Destined to Join the Union ? 
 Turkey occupies a special place in the EU ’ s enlargement policy. Already the 1963 
EU-Turkey association agreement (see Chapter 13) provides that the contracting 
parties  ‘ shall examine the possibility of the accession of Turkey to the Community ’ as 
soon as the operation of the agreement had advanced far enough. 26 In 1987, Turkey 
formally applied for EEC membership. In its 1989 opinion, the Commission concluded 
that it was not the appropriate moment for starting accession negotiations taking 
into account the diffi  cult economic and political situation in Turkey. Nevertheless, 
it confi rmed Turkey ’ s eligibility for membership and suggested that the completion 
of the customs union would be helpful to deepen the bilateral relationship. 27 After 
the adoption of association council Decision No 1/95 and against the background 
of the EU ’ s enlargement policy including the CEECs, Malta and Cyprus, the 1999 
Helsinki European Council signifi cantly upgraded the position of Turkey within the 
EU enlargement process when it concluded that  ‘ Turkey is a candidate state destined 
to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate 
countries. ’ 28 
 The opening of accession negotiations started in October 2005 but rather quickly 
the Council blocked the opening of a series of important negotiating chapters in reac-
tion to Turkey ’ s refusal to open its air and sea ports to planes and vessels from the 
Republic of Cyprus. This, in turn, is the direct result of Turkey ’ s refusal to recognise 
the authorities of the Republic of Cyprus as the legitimate representatives of the entire 
island. 29 Despite several attempts to re-energise the negotiations, Turkey ’ s accession 
process has been stalled since the failed coup attempt of July 2016. 
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 European Commission Staff  Working Document, Turkey 2018 Report, SWD 
(2018) 153 fi nal, 3 
 Turkey remains a key partner for the European Union.  … Within the framework 
of accession negotiations, 16 chapters have been opened so far and one of these 
was provisionally closed. The Turkish government reiterated its commitment 
to EU accession but this has not been matched by corresponding measures and 
reforms. On the contrary, Turkey has been moving away from the European 
Union. The Presidency conclusions of December 2016 stated that under the 
currently prevailing circumstances, no new chapters are considered for opening. 
 In March 2019, the European Parliament recommended the formal suspension of 
accession negotiations with Turkey and suggested a redefi nition of the existing relation-
ship based upon a modernisation of the customs union. 30 The Parliament ’ s resolution 
is non-binding and requires further initiatives from the Commission and the Council. 
 IV. Leaving the EU 
 A. The Legal Framework 
 Before 2009, there was no clause setting out a procedure for leaving the Union. This 
changed with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which introduced Article 50 TEU. 
 Article 50 TEU 
 1.  Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance 
with its own constitutional requirements. 
 2.  A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European 
Council of its intention. In the light of the guidelines provided by the 
 European Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement 
with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking 
account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union. That 
agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with Article  218(3) of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. It shall be concluded 
on behalf  of the Union by the Council, acting by a qualifi ed majority, after 
obtaining the consent of the European Parliament. 
  30  European Parliament Resolution of 13 March 2019 on the 2018 Commission Report on Turkey, 
P8_TA(2019)0200. 
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 3.  The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of 
entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after 
the notifi cation referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, 
in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to 
extend this period. 
 4.  For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3, the member of the European 
Council or of the Council representing the withdrawing Member State 
shall not participate in the discussions of the European Council or Council 
or in decisions concerning it. 
  A qualifi ed majority shall be defi ned in accordance with Article 238(3)(b) 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
 5.  If  a State which has withdrawn from the Union asks to rejoin, its request 
shall be subject to the procedure referred to in Article 49. 
 B. The Procedure for Leaving the Union 
 Article 50 TEU calls upon the Union to negotiate and conclude  ‘ an agreement with 
that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the 
frame work for its future relationship with the Union ’ . Reference is made to 
Article  218(3) TFEU, which is part of the EU ’ s general procedure for the negotia-
tion and conclusion of international agreements with third states (see Chapter 4). 
According to Article 50(2) TEU, such a withdrawal agreement  ‘ shall be concluded on 
behalf  of the Union by the Council, acting by a qualifi ed majority, after obtaining the 
consent of the European Parliament ’ . It is interesting to note that to join the Union a 
legal relationship with the current Member States needs to be established but to leave 
the Union, a State will have to settle the issue with the organisation of which it has 
become a member, which is a complex endeavour. 
 A  Ł azowski,  ‘ Withdrawal from the European Union and Alternatives to 
Membership ’ (2012) 37  European Law Review 523, 539 – 41 
 This analysis demonstrates that a departure is politically and legally possible; 
at the same time it will be an extremely complex and controversial exercise. 
Article 50 TEU provides only a general legal framework for withdrawal and 
a lot of additional decisions would be required in order to develop this into a 
fully-fl edged withdrawal  acquis . Although theoretically one can come to the 
conclusion that art. 50 TEU allows for a unilateral withdrawal, the analysis 
above shows that this is rather illusory. It is argued that to facilitate an exit 
the European Union will have to negotiate an agreement with the depart-
ing State which will not only outline the terms of departure but also regulate 
future relations between the two sides. Such an agreement would be concluded 
in accordance with art. 218 TFEU, and therefore would fall fully under the 
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jurisdiction of the Court of Justice. Furthermore, lacunae left by the legislator 
will have to be fi lled by the decision-makers when the departure of a particular 
Member State from the European Union becomes a reality  … 
 The best arrangement for future relations between a divorc é e and the European 
Union remains uncertain. The two existing models of integration without 
membership may be tempting for those whose understanding of the idiosyn-
crasies of the European Economic Area and the Swiss model is limited. But 
as soon as the basic issues in these models are explored, it becomes clear that 
neither would now be acceptable for a former Member State of the European 
Union (or the European Union itself). Furthermore, one should also remember 
that if  a country decides to leave the European Union, art. 50(5) TEU must be 
taken into account. In order to return to the European Union such a country 
would have to go through the entire accession process from scratch. In the case 
of a country like the United Kingdom, the renegotiation of existing opt-outs 
and budgetary rebate would be politically very diffi  cult, if  not impossible. One 
has to remember that any new entrant is obliged to accept participation in the 
Economic and Monetary Union and the Schengen Conventions. 
 In conclusion, a divorce from the European Union should not be the triumph 
of the imagination over intelligence or hope over experience, but a decision 
based on a very thorough political, economic and legal analysis  – as the conse-
quences in all possible respects will be profound. 
 In the wake of the referendum in the United Kingdom of June 2016, which resulted in 
a 52 percent overall majority in favour of leaving the EU, a number of developments 
have started to clarify how the process of withdrawal operates. 
 According to Article 50(1) TEU, the decision to leave must be taken based on a 
Member State ’ s  ‘ own constitutional requirements ’ . In the case of the UK, the ques-
tion arose as to whether the British Government could issue the offi  cial notifi cation 
that launched the withdrawal process mentioned in Article 50(2) on its own  – as an 
exercise of so-called  ‘ prerogative powers ’ in the area of foreign policy  – or whether 
parliamentary consent would be required. This question was ultimately settled by the 
UK Supreme Court in the  Miller case, in which it ruled that, due to the special nature 
of EU law, parliamentary consent was indeed necessary. 
 R (on the Application of Miller and Another) (Respondents) v Secretary 
of State for Exiting the European Union (Appellant) [2017] UKSC 5 
 86  … the EU Treaties not only concern the international relations of the United 
Kingdom, they are a source of domestic law, and they are a source of domestic 
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legal rights many of which are inextricably linked with domestic law from other 
sources. Accordingly, the Royal prerogative to make and unmake treaties, which 
operates wholly on the international plane, cannot be exercised in relation to 
the EU Treaties, at least in the absence of domestic sanction in appropriate 
statutory form  … 
 90 The EU Treaties as implemented pursuant to the 1972 [European 
Communities] Act were and are unique in their legislative and constitutional 
implications. In 1972, for the fi rst time in the history of the United Kingdom, 
a dynamic, international source of law was grafted onto, and above, the 
well-established existing sources of domestic law: Parliament and the courts.  … 
 101 Accordingly, we consider that, in light of the terms and eff ect of the 1972 
Act, and subject to considering the eff ect of subsequent legislation and events, 
the prerogative could not be invoked by ministers to justify giving Notice: minis-
ters require the authority of primary legislation before they can take that course. 
 This judgment, of course, only applies to the constitutional system of the UK. 
Nevertheless, it creates a presumption that, given the wide-ranging eff ects that with-
drawal from the EU on domestic legislation and individual rights would have in 
any Member State, parliamentary consent would likely be required elsewhere, too. 
Moreover and in contrast to the UK ’ s  ‘ unwritten ’ constitution, some Member States ’ 
constitutions explicitly presume or demand EU membership. Hence, the decision to 
leave the EU might even require constitutional amendment in these countries. 
 French Constitution, Article 88-1 
 The Republic shall participate in the European Communities and in the 
European Union constituted by States that have freely chosen, by virtue of the 
treaties that established them, to exercise some of their powers in common. 
 German Basic Law, Article 23(1) 
 With a view to establishing a united Europe, the Federal Republic of Germany 
shall participate in the development of the European Union that is committed to 
democratic, social and federal principles, to the rule of law and to the principle 
of subsidiarity and that guarantees a level of protection of basic rights essen-
tially comparable to that aff orded by this Basic Law. To this end the Federation 
may transfer sovereign powers by a law with the consent of the Bundesrat.  … 
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 Once a Member State offi  cially issues the notifi cation to withdraw, negotiations between 
the withdrawing state and the EU commence. Negotiations on the EU ’ s side, as with 
most international agreements with third countries, are conducted by the European 
Commission with a mandate from the Council. 
 An important feature of the Article 50 TEU procedure is that it starts a two-year 
countdown during which a Withdrawal Agreement must be concluded. This time 
limit can only be extended by a unanimous decision of the European Council and the 
withdrawing Member State as per Article 50(3) TEU. The time limit is a way to put 
pressure on the withdrawing Member State to come to an agreement with the EU and 
not keep the entire Union in a state of uncertainty for too long. 
 In this context, the question arose whether a notifi cation of the intention to leave 
the EU can be revoked and, if  so, under which circumstances. There were concerns 
that opening up that possibility would undermine the eff ect of the time limit, giving the 
withdrawing Member State the opportunity to gain time for obtaining more favourable 
terms from the EU. This issue was settled by the CJEU in the  Wightman case. 
 Case C - 621/18,  Wightman v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union , 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:999 
 73 It follows, in the fi rst place, that, for as long as a withdrawal agreement 
concluded between the European Union and that Member State has not entered 
into force or, if  no such agreement has been concluded, for as long as the 
two-year period laid down in Article 50(3) TEU, possibly extended in accord-
ance with that provision, has not expired, that Member State  – which enjoys, 
subject to Article 50(4) TEU, all of the rights and remains bound by all of the 
obligations laid down in the Treaties  – retains the ability to revoke unilater-
ally the notifi cation of its intention to withdraw from the European Union, in 
accordance with its constitutional requirements. 
 74 In the second place, the revocation of the notifi cation of the intention to 
withdraw must, fi rst, be submitted in writing to the European Council and, 
secondly, be unequivocal and unconditional, that is to say that the purpose 
of that revocation is to confi rm the EU membership of the Member State 
concerned under terms that are unchanged as regards its status as a Member 
State, and that revocation brings the withdrawal procedure to an end. 
 Thus, while a unilateral revocation is possible, the Court stressed that it needs to be 
 ‘ unequivocal and unconditional ’ (ie, it must not be used as a tactic in ongoing with-
drawing negotiations). At the same time, a Member State that decides to remain after 
all keeps all its rights, including any opt-outs that may apply to it. 
 The withdrawal agreement negotiated under Article 50 TEU must be distinguished 
from future agreements between the EU and its former Member State. According to 
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  31  Paul  McClean et al,  ‘ The Brexit Treaty Renegotiation Checklist ’ ,  Financial Times ,  20 August 2017 . 
  32  J  Larik ,  ‘ Sincere Cooperation in the Common Commercial Policy :  Lisbon, a  “ Joined-Up ” Union, and 
 “ Brexit ” ’ ( 2017 )  8  European Yearbook of International Economic Law  83, 103 – 04 . 
Article 50(2) TEU, the withdrawal agreement only has to take into account  ‘ the frame-
work ’ for the withdrawing state ’ s  ‘ future relationship with the Union ’ . Having become a 
third country from the point of view of the EU, future agreements would be concluded 
following the general procedure of Article 218 TFEU (Chapter 4). Nevertheless, any 
withdrawal agreement is likely to include a transitional period to ease the disentangling 
of the relationship between the EU and its former Member State and provide time for 
negotiating agreements establishing the future relationship with as little disruption and 
legal uncertainty as possible. 
 C. The External Dimension of Leaving the EU 
 Leaving the Union has also important external repercussions. In the fi rst place, a 
Member State which had control over the levers of  EU external action from within 
the Union subsequently becomes an object of  EU external action. As a third state, 
it will have to negotiate agreements with the EU in the various areas of  EU compe-
tence as described in the previous chapters. Moreover, that state can become the 
target of  unliteral EU actions such as sanctions or international dispute settlement 
at the WTO. 
 In addition, leaving the EU to a large extent also redefi nes that state’s relations 
with the rest of the world. As was pointed out in  Chapter 4 , the EU is an active 
international-treaty maker. In areas of exclusive competence, the EU concludes inter-
national agreements with third parties on its own, without the need for the Member 
States to be parties as well. Therefore, once a country leaves the EU, these international 
agreements no longer apply to it. In the context of Brexit, it was estimated that more 
than 700 treaties with third countries would cease to apply to the UK. 31 
 It is then up to the former Member State and the respective third countries to 
negotiate either  ‘ continuity agreements ’ to replace the erstwhile EU agreements or 
to negotiate new agreements between them. However, negotiating such agreements 
already during the Article 50 TEU process (ie, while a country is still a Member State) 
might violate the duty of sincere cooperation set out in Article 4(3) TEU, 32 as explained 
in Chapter 2). 
 More importantly, the withdrawing Member State will not know what it may be 
able to off er during such negotiations until it has settled its future relationship with the 
EU. For example, if  a former Member State opts for staying in a customs union with 
the EU or align its regulations with EU rules in an EEA-style setting (see Chapter 13), 
that limits its freedom to reduce tariff s or adopt laxer regulatory standards in its rela-
tions with other third countries. 
 A particularly intricate issue is the disentanglement of a Member State from the 
EU ’ s mixed agreements (see Chapter 4), since the withdrawing Member State is a party 
to these agreements  – at least at fi rst glance  – in its own right. 
488 THE EXTERNAL DIMENSION OF JOINING AND LEAVING THE EU
 RA Wessel,  ‘ Consequences of Brexit for International Agreements Concluded 
by the EU and its Member States ’ (2018) 55  Common Market Law Review 101, 
119 – 20 
 At fi rst sight, the situation could be easier in the case of so-called  ‘ mixed agree-
ments ’ (concluded by both the EU and its Member States with one or more 
third States or international organizations) as the UK, as one of the signatories, 
seems to be a  “ party ” in its own right and bound directly under public inter-
national law. Yet, in the case of bilateral mixed agreements in particular the 
Member States and the EU are presented as a  ‘ team ’ . This is often underlined 
by the preamble, where it provides that the agreement is concluded between 
the third country, of the one part, and the European Union and its Member 
States, of the other part, jointly referred to as  ‘ the Parties ’ . Signifi cantly, several 
mixed agreements include a clause defi ning the term  ‘ Parties ’ as  ‘ the Union or 
its Member States, or the Union and its Member States, in accordance with 
their respective competences, on the one hand, and (the third country), on the 
other ’ . Furthermore, just as in the case of EU-only agreements  … , mixed agree-
ments (again primarily bilateral ones) often have territorial application clauses 
defi ned in terms of the territory of EU Member States.  … 
 While most mixed EU FTAs contain specifi c provisions for the termination of 
their operation, they do not provide for a special termination clause in case of 
withdrawal of a State from the EU. For some, this leads to the conclusion that 
 ‘ the UK ’ s withdrawal from the EU will not as such aff ect its capacity as a formal 
 ‘ party ’ to mixed EU FTAs ’ . Perhaps the better question is to what extent they 
will continue to  apply to the UK  … 
 In that respect, it is essential to recall that these are not just international 
agreements that the UK entered into individually, despite the remark made by 
Advocate General Sharpston [in Opinion 2/15] that Member States are parties 
to the agreement as sovereign States,  ‘ not as a mere appendage of the European 
Union ’ . As an  ‘ integral part of EU law ’  – in the words of the EU Court  – 
these agreements are closely connected to other EU legislation and policies. 
Moreover, many mixed agreements are concluded without a strict indication of 
what falls under EU competences and what is still in the hands of the Member 
States  … 
 Thus, for bilateral mixed agreements (ie between the EU and its Member States and 
one third party) renegotiation or some other form of joint understanding on the 
continued applicability to the former Member State might be the best way to ensure 
legal certainty. For multilateral mixed agreements, including those setting up interna-
tional institutions in which the EU participates (Chapter 6), the situation of the former 
Member State is more secure. For instance, leaving the EU will not change that state ’ s 
status as a member of the WTO, NATO or the UN, for instance. Nevertheless, in 
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certain instances, its term of membership may be aff ected. In the context of the WTO, 
for instance, tariff  rate quotas that were negotiated for the entire EU would have to 
be split up. 
 Finally, it is important to note that  – as we have seen in  Chapters 4 and 5  – changes 
in EU membership may also have consequences under international law. In relation 
to EU agreements concluded with third states, at least a notifi cation to those states 
(or members of other international organisations) may be required; occasionally, 
third parties may have to agree with changes resulting from the withdrawal of an EU 
Member State, for instance through an additional protocol. 
 V. The Broader Picture of EU External Relations Law 
 This chapter addressed both the accession to and withdrawal from the EU. As was 
shown, both processes are time-consuming, complex and require protracted negotia-
tions. Even though both involve myriad technical issues, at their heart they raise both 
fundamental, if  not existential, questions (What is  ‘ European ’ ? What is  ‘ sovereignty ’ ? ) 
as well as highly sensitive political topics (How many new states can the Union 
 ‘ absorb ’ ? What should the future relationship with a state that decided to leave look 
like ? ). Having started with the six founding members, the Union ’ s membership has 
more than quadrupled. It now includes states from the Atlantic to the Russian border, 
from the Mediterranean to the Arctic Circle, as well as former communist countries 
and countries that had not (re)gained their independence 30 years ago or have not 
known the many decades of peace enjoyed by other Member States. 
 At the same time, the referendum in the UK and its aftermath has shown that 
membership of the EU can come to an end. Thanks to Article 50 TEU, there is now 
a procedure to organise a withdrawal in a manner that minimises the potential for 
unravelling the European integration project more broadly and sets the stage for a 
friendly future relationship with states that choose to leave the Union. 
 As this chapter has shown, both joining and leaving the EU have strong external 
repercussions. Before a state can join the EU, it needs to go through the accession 
procedure to align itself  with the EU ’ s  acquis and values. In that sense, its enlarge-
ment policy has been one of the EU ’ s most eff ective forms of external action causing 
wide-ranging reforms in outside countries. For the EU, more Member States and more 
people have meant more capacity and greater global reach, including one of the larg-
est markets in the world and a legal system that has become a standard setter in areas 
ranging from food safety to data protection. However, an expanded membership has 
also meant interests that are more diverse, which makes it more diffi  cult to compromise. 
 At the same time, once a Member State decides to leave the EU it is, to some extent, 
treated as a third country right away, as it will have to negotiate the terms of its with-
drawal with the rest of the EU. Once out of the EU, it will have become a third country 
and thus an object of the EU ’ s external action. As the EU positions itself  in an increas-
ingly multipolar world, its membership will determine what kind of a community and 
what kind of an actor it will be on the international stage. 
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